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Abstract 
The essential facilities doctrine is a tool of competition authorities to decide on 
the access of a would-be competitor to the facility of another competitor. 
It will be argued that there is no such thing as one essential facilities doctrine. The 
different jurisdictions have developed different requirements according to their needs. 
The combination of these national requirements can be seen as one essential facility. This 
gives rise to a difficulty in defining the essential facilities doctrine in more than a general 
way. Instead of giving a complete definition and a criteria against which cases can be 
assessed a set of certain requirements can be identified as common in the different 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, these criteria might be interpreted in different ways. 
Therefore, any definition must be broad. Further, the desirability of having a doctrine and 
access rights at all will be limited to exceptional circumstances only. 
Advantages and disadvantages of "light-handed regulation" as well as industry 
specific regulators will be assessed. Further, the approach of the different jurisdictions 
under evaluation in the telecommunications sector will be illustrated. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
14,292 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper illustrates the attitude and the approach adopted concemmg the 
essential facilities doctrine in Australia, New Zealand, Germany and Europe. The early 
developments in the United States of America will be discussed in order to provide a 
better understanding of the essential facilities doctrine and its background. 
The second part of this paper gives an overview of the European, German, 
Australian and New Zealand response to the US involvement in the creation of the 
doctrine. This part will also analyse the implementation of the essential facilities doctrine 
in these countries. 
The following section tries to present a definition of the essential facilities 
doctrine, while the fourth part is dedicated to the evaluation of the desirability of granting 
access rights in the light of balancing short-term promotion of competition against long-
term harm to investments. 
The next part focuses on the different regulatory approaches the jurisdictions in 
question have taken to deal with the issue of access rights to certain essential facilities. 
The subsequent section of this paper analyses some of the requirements that are 
comparable in the different countries in question. This is followed by an introduction into 
the area of telecommunications. The access to these networks and services is outlined. 
II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A United States of America 
The legal term of "essential facilities"' originates from the antitrust jurisprudence 
in the United States of America. 2 
1 Also referred to as ,,bottleneck doctrine".Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland 
Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 679 (HC); Hecht v Pro-Football Inc (1977) 570 F 2d 982,992; Valentine 
Korah "Access to Essential Facilities under the Commerce Act in the Light of Experience in Australia, the 
European Union and the United States " (2000) 31 VUWLR 231, 246; Brenda Marshall/ Rachael Mulheron 
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The development of a common law doctrine in general and the essential facilities 
doctrine in particular can be described in three stages:3 
( 1) An extreme case arises to which a court responds. 
(2) The language of that response is then applied - often mechanically, sometimes cleverly 
- to expand the application. With too few judges experienced enough with the subject 
to resist, the doctrine expands to the limits of its language, with little regard to policy. 
(3) Such expansions ultimately become ridiculous, and the process of cutting back begins. 
The case of US v Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis4 decided in 1912 can 
be seen as the first stage in the development of the doctrine. 5 In this case the Supreme 
Court established an access right to the undertaking that was in control of the tracks. A 
case that followed was Associated Press v United States .6 The Court held that the 
Associated Press had to change its admission policy for public policy reasons, namely the 
need for free access to publicly available information. 
"Access to 'Essential Facilities' under Part Il!A of the Trade Practices Act: Implementing the Legislative 
Regime" (1998) BOND LR 99, 100 note 12; Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to 
Essential Facilities in Australia " 28 ABLR 325. 
2 Volker Emmerich Kartellrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Milnchen, 2001) 201 ; Meinrad Dreher, "Die 
Verweigerung des Zugangs zu einer wesentlichen Einrichtung als Missbrauch der Marktbeherrschung " 
DB, 1999, 833. 
3 Phillip Areeda "Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles " (1990) 58 ALJ 841. 
4 US v Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis (1912) 224 US 390. 
5 The Terminal Railroad Association controlled passages into and out of St Louis, which was an important 
railroad junction of that time. This monopoly facility acquired by a combination of some, but not all, of the 
railroads transited St Louis. The association of railroads was in a position to use the monopoly to 
disadvantage other competitors by excluding them from the necessary passage. 
6 Associated Press v United States ( 1945) 326 US 1; The Associated Press consisted of about 1200 
newspapers. The Members had access to all the collected and generated information world-wide. The 
Associated Press welcomed new members, unless the applicant competed with an incumbent. This policy 
blocked competitors. Although it was held that Associated Press had not to admit everyone. Nevertheless, 
for public reasons and the free press a maximum flow of information had to be secured. 
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However, the case of Hecht v Pro-Football Inc7 established the doctrine under its 
present name in 1977.8 The essential facilities doctrine was encapsulated for the first time 
in the following way: 9 
Where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in 
possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade 
to foreclosure the scarce facility. 
To be "essential", a facility need not be indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the 
facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap 
on potential market entrants. Necessarily, trus principle must be carefully delimited; the 
antitrust laws do not require that an essential facility be shared if such sharing would be 
impractical or would inrubit the defendant's ability to serve its customers adequately. 
The second and the third stage mentioned earlier in the development of the 
essential facilities doctrine in the common law of the United States cannot be 
distinguished exactly. The need for restrictive requirements for the new doctrine was 
already recognised in MCI Communications v American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 10 
Subsequently the courts had to take four elements into account that could create an access 
right: 11 
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
(2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
7 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc (1977) 570 F 2d 982. 
8 Trus case was a private antitrust action brought by a group of promoters who had sought to obtain a 
professional football league franchise, against the owners of the Washington Redskins to access their 
stadium for training sessions and games. The denial of this prevented them from submitting an acceptable 
francruse application. 
9 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc (1977) 570 F 2d 982, 992. 
'
0 MCI Communications Corp v American Telephone & Telegraph Co (1983) 708 F 2d 1081 ; This 1983 
case involved the interconnection in telecommunications decided before the breakup of AT&T. Among 
other claims against AT&T, MCI alleged that AT&T had refused to grant it interconnection with its local 
network or imposed inreasonable conditions on interconnection, thereby preventing MCI from offering any 
service other than long-distance leased lines. 
11 Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, National Competition Policy, 
(AGPS, Canberra, 1993) (later referred to as Hilmer Report), chapter 11 , 239, 244; Brenda Marshall/ 
Rachael Mulheron "Access to 'Essential Facilities ' under Part JJJA of the Trade Practices Act: 
Implementing the l egislative Regime" ( 1998) BOND LR 99, IOI. 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
( 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 
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It is important to remember the origin and the legal background of the doctrine at 
all times. An assessment of the desirability of applying the essential facilities doctrine in 
the countries or jurisdictions the subject of this paper can be successful only then. This is 
also important in making an informed and reasonable decision about certain requirements 
being mandatory, necessary or just sufficient to grant an access right. 
In the United States the crucial rules are found within sections 112 and i1 3 of the 
Sherman Act 1890. Abusive behaviour under the essential facilities doctrine can be seen 
there as a special case of refusal to deal. It can be seen as "monopolisation" and therefore 
a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 if a single firm owns the facility in 
question. The collaborative conduct of several firms, which own a facility, can be seen as 
"conspiracy in restraint of trade". This amounts to a violation of section 1 of the same 
Act.14 
12 Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890: Trusts, etc. , in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who 
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
13 Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890: Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
14 Mats A. Bergmann "The role of the essential facilities doctrine " (Summer 2001) The Antitrust Bulletin 
403,405. 
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B European Regulation 
The European competition law is similar to the Sherman Act 1890 of the United 
States. The two articles that deal with issues that are related to the essential facilities 
doctrine are articles 81 15 and 8216 of the EC Treaty. 17 Refusal to deal is a special case of 
the abuse of dominance under article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty. 
15 Article 81 EC Treaty: 
( 1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment 
( c) share markets or sources of supply 
( d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at competitive disadvantage 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
(3) The provisions of paragraph l may however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings 
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings 
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of 
the products in question. 
16 Article 82 EC Treaty: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect 
trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of customers 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage 
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Within the European competition law system, the Commission of the European 
Communities (EC) is "the guardian of the treaties".
18 It is in charge of the application and 
enforcement of articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty where the cases have an impact on the 
Common Market. 19 As a result, the Commission has to monitor the behaviour of 
competitors. 
The second possibility for the Commission to become active is a complaint of a 
competitor about the unlawful behaviour of another. The Commission can take actions 
against the offender if it is of the opinion that a certain conduct breaches the provisions of 
the EC Treaty. 
As a consequence, the first recognition was given to the essential facilities 
doctrine in Europe in decisions of the European Commission in 1992 and 1993. These 
decisions are commonly referred to as "sea-harbour"-cases.
20 An example is the Sea 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
17 The enumeration was changed after the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 
October 1997. It entered into force on 1 August 1999. Articles 81 and 82 were formerl y articles 85 and 86. 
European Integration http://europa.eu.int/abc/treaties en.htrn (Last accessed 21 July 2002). 
18 Butterworths guide to the European Communities (Butterworths, London, Dublin, Edinburgh, Munich, 
1989) 21. 
19 Articles 81 (I) and 82 (I) of the EC Treaty require for the application of competition law that the limiting 
action in question can possibly impair the trade between Member States. The applicability of the European 
and the national competition law shall be marked off through this clause. Nowadays, the practical 
significance of the Zwischenstaatlichkeitsklausel (inter state clause) is in most of the cases very low. The 
requirements of that clause are already met if the circumstances are capable of impairing the trade between 
Member States directly or indirectly in a manner that thwarts the goal of a common market. This is the case 
with barriers to trade and the creation of obstacles for the mutual penetration of the markets. See Volker 
Emmerich Kartellrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Milnchen, 2001) 374. 
20 B & J Line pie v Sea/ink Harbours Ltd and Sea/ink Stena Ltd (Case IV 34.174) [1992] 5 CMLR 255; 
Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 (Case IV 34.689) Sea Containers v Stena Sea/ink - interim 
measures; Meimad Dreher, "Die Verweigerung des Zugangs zu einer wesentlichen Einrichtung als 
Missbrauch der Marktbeherrschung " (1999) 16 DB 833; Thomas Lampert "Der EuGH und die essential 
facilities-Leh re" ( 1999) 31 NJW 2235. 
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Containers v Stena Sealinl< 1 case. The basis for a decision in favour of Sea Containers 
ceased to exist in the end. However, the Commission indicated its readiness to grant Sea 
Containers an access right on the basis of the essential facilities doctrine. 22 
The second authority that shapes the competition law in Europe is the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The national competition authorities are in charge of the national 
competition law. Further, the national competition authorities have the power to act if the 
behaviour of the competitor of a certain Member State has an effect on the markets and 
competitors of other Member States and the main effect is in the one Member State.23 
However, they have to apply articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The legal systems of the 
Member States have to provide judicial review against the decision of the national 
competition authority. The national courts have to ensure that they take the relevant 
European legislation and principles into account. In the case of judicial review article 234 
of the EC Treaty provides an optional possibility for the national court to seek the opinion 
of the ECJ if a court has doubts about the European implications. The procedure is 
mandatory for a court of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law, according to article 234 (III) of the EC Treaty. 
21 Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 (Case IV 34.689) Sea Containers v Stena Sea/ink - interim 
measures; Sea Containers wanted to compete with the harbour-owning Stena Sealink on the ferry route 
between Holyhead in the UK and Laoghaire near Dublin in Ireland. Negotiations took place over almost 2 
years without a result. A complaint of Sea Containers about the delaying tactics of Stena Sealink was not 
successful for the sole reason that both parties reached an agreement in the end. 
22 Sea Containers could have asked for damages for the lost 1993 season like Clear Communications did in 
his litigation against Telecom. (This case will be discussed later in this paper.) However, the difference 
between the two cases is that Stena Sealink and Sea Containers reached an agreement in the end. In 
addition to that, to actually prove the delaying tactics of Stena Sealink would not have been easy. 
23 The extensive manner of the interpretation of the Zwischenstaatlichkeitsklausel (inter state clause) leads 
to a parallel applicability of national and European competition law. However, in the case of colliding 
regulations the European law prevails. Maria Salonia v Giorgio Poidomani and France Baglieri, nee 
Giglio (Case 126/80) [1981] European Court Reports 1563, 1578; SPRL Louis Erauw - Jacquery v La 
Hesbignonne SC (Case 27/87) [1988] European Court Reports 1919, 1939; SC Belasco and Others v 
Commission of the European Communities (Case 246/86) [1989] European Court Reports 2117, 2189; 
Carlo Bagnasco and Others v Banca Popolare di Novarar soc. Coop. Ar/. (BNP) (Case 215/96) [1999] 
European Court Reports I-135 ; See also Volker Emmerich Kartellrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Miinchen, 
2001) 376. 
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A case in which the ECJ had to decide about competition law in general and the 
essential facilities doctrine in particular is the Austrian case of Oscar Bronner. 24 This 
case will be discussed later in this paper in more depth. 
C Germany 
German competition law is influenced to a large extent by European 
developments. This is due to the hierarchy of the European acts of law in relation to the 
national law of the Member States. Primary European law is always superior to German 
national laws if there is a conflict for example between the European and the German 
legal system. In the area of competition law, the Member States have jurisdiction in cases 
that affect their territory only. The competition authority of a certain Member State has a 
shared competence with the Commission if the main effect of a cross boarder cases is in 
that Member State. 25 However, the courts have to take the European repercussions into 
account if the Common Market is also affected. 
In Germany it is the purpose of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen 
(Act against Restraints of Competition - later referred to as GWB) to enable competition 
in the first place.26 Similar to the European system, the national competition authorities 
are in charge of safeguarding competition on the national level. The courts only have a 
chance to shape competition law in cases of the judicial review of certain decisions. 
Due to the influence of the "sea-harbour" -cases mentioned above on the European 
level and the subsequent Commission decisions, the German legislator changed the GWB 
24 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. 
KG [1998] ECR 1-7791. In this case the publisher of the small national Austrian newspaper "Der Standard" 
demanded access to the home delivery scheme of another publisher who was in a dominant position. 
Bronner argued that it would be uneconomical to set up another delivery system. Nevertheless, the court 
held that Bronner could use another scheme like the postal service as an alternative. 
25 Articles 81 (I) and 82 (I) of the EC Treaty require for the application of competition law that the limiting 
action in question can possibly impair the trade between Member States. The Zwischenstaatlichkeitsklausel 
(inter state clause) is the decisive test for the jurisdiction. See note 19. 
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in order to embody the European development in the German statutes and to anticipate 
the future developments in that area. The German Parliament adopted the Sixth 
Amendment of the GWB in May 1998. These changes came into force on 1 January 
1999. This led to a moderate harmonisation of the German and the European competition 
law.27 At the same time, this improved the level of protection provided by the statute as a 
whole.28 
The relevant change in relation to essential facilities was the introduction of § 19 
IV Nr. 4 GWB. This new subsection was embodied into § 19 GWB dealing with "the 
abuse of a dominant market position", which illustrates the context of the essential 
facilities doctrine in German competition law. 
D Australia 
In Australia the Hilmer Report29 was highly influential on the development of the 
competition law in the area of the misuse of market power and the establishment of an 
essential facilities doctrine. The Hilmer Report was published in 1993. It stated: 
In some markets the introduction of effective competition requires competitors to have 
access to facilities , which exhibit natural monopoly characteristics and hence cannot be 
duplicated econornically.30 
As a result of the suggestions made by the Hilmer Report, all Australian state 
governments signed the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) on 11 April 1995. 
31 
26 On a second level the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act against Unfair Competition) secures 
that competition is taking place in a fair manner. 
27 Rainer Bechthold "Das neue Kartellgesetz" (1998) 38 NJW 2769-2770; Bundesrninisterium for 
Wirtschaft, Nationales Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht 
http: //www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Politikfelder/wirtschaftspolitik/wettbewerbspolitik/wettbewerbspolitik/Kar 
tellrecht-national.jsp. 
28 Bundesrninisterium fur W irtschaft, W ettbewerbspolitik 
http: //www.bmwi.de/Homepage/Politikfelder/wirtschaftspolitik/wettbewerbspolitik.scr?url=Homepage/Poli 
tikfelder/wirtschaftspolitik/wettbewerbspolitik/wettbewerbspolitik.jsp&SB=GWB&host=wwwbmwi.de. 
29 Hilmer Report, eh 11 , 239. 
30 Hilmer Report, eh 11 , 239. 
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Further, as a result of the recommendations made by the Hilmer Committee in 
1995 Part IHA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, dealing with the access to essential 
facilities, was enacted. This was a significant step for the Australian government to take, 
as this part of the Trade Practices Act was one of the earliest statutory regulations of the 
essential facilities doctrine. Only Denmark in 199?32 and Germany in 199933 have taken 
this step so far. Other jurisdictions left the issue for the courts to deal with under some 
general competition law rules. 34 Part IHA was designed to achieve through regulatory 
means what the courts had been reluctant to achieve in applying the misuse of market 
power provisions in section 46 of the Trade Practices Act. 35 
A prominent case, indicating the opposite in terms of the willingness of the courts 
to recognise the essential facilities doctrine, is Queensland Wire36. Although the High 
Court remitted the case for further hearing to the Federal Court, it also indicated that it 
was in favour of a duty of BHP supplying Queensland Wire under section 46 of the Trade 
31 The Commonwealth and all State and Territory governments have agreed to a national competition 
policy to generate broad based community benefits and improve Australia's competitiveness in international 
markets. The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Premiers of the States of New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania and the Chief Ministers of 
the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory of Australia signed the Conduct Code 
Agreement, Competition Principles Agreement and Agreement to Implement the National Competition 
Policy and Related Reforms. See Tony Buri, E Law - Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Vo! 
4, No 4 (December 1997) http: //www.competition.act.gov.au/comp/chp I.html (Last accessed 17 September 
2002) and ACT Government, National Competition Policy An Overview 
http: //www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v4n4/buti44.htrnl (Last accessed 17 September). 
32 Law No 384 of 10 June 1997. 
33 § 19 IV Nr. 4 GWB . 
34 Like ss 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 in the US, arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and s 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 in New Zealand. 
35 The regulatory system of Part IIIA, Part XIC and s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Australia will 
be analysed later in this paper. 
36 Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and 
another [1988-1989] 167 CLR 177 (HCA); In this case, The Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) was 
responsible for about 97 per cent of Australia 's steel output and products. It refused to supply Queensland 
Wire with a product called Y-bar, which is necessary to produce "star picket posts", the most popular rural 
fences. 
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Practices Act 1974. Therefore, it is questionable that the courts were really reluctant to 
grant access rights under section 46 and that a statutory action was necessary. 
E New Zealand 
As a result of the implementation of the Commerce Act 1986 in New Zealand 
courts adopt the essential facilities doctrine as a special case of the abuse of a dominant 
position under section 36 of that Act. 37 The willingness of the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine was not only an outcome of the intended harmonisation of the New 
Zealand competition law with the one of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, but 
also due to the influence of the European Community. The section 3 (8)38 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 was based on article 86 of the EC Treaty39. 
37 Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 "Taking advantage of market power-: 
(1) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct to which this Part applies that that has 
been authorisd under Part V. 
(2) A person that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not take advantage of that power 
for the purpose of-
( a) restricting the entry of a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market; or 
(b) preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any 
other market; or 
( c) eliminating a person from that or any other market. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person does not take advantage of a substantial degree of power 
in a market by reason only that the person seeks to enforce a statutory intellectual property right, 
within the meaning of section 45 (2), in New Zealand. 
( 4) For the purposes of this section, a reference to a person includes 2 or more persons that are 
interconnected. 
Previously section 36 of the Commerce Act applied the use of a dominant position in a market as a 
threshold. 
38 Subsection (8) was repealed, as from 26 May 2001 , by s 9 (3) Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001 (2001 No 32). 
39 This article is now article 82 EC Treaty. 
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An early indication of the readiness of the courts to apply the essential facilities 
doctrine in New Zealand was the case of ARA v Mutual Rental Cars40. After 
consideration of the essential facilities doctrine, Barker J held: 41 
[It] is correct to submit that a gateway facility is likely to beget a separate and identifiable 
geographic market and that exclusion from that market by means of the gateway, prirna 
facie indicates anti-competitive intention unless the exclusion can be explained by 
reference to reasonable constraints in the circumstances: an agreement to exclude others 
arbitrarily must be taken as having the purpose to monopolise. Although ARA's motive 
may have been to maximise rent, by accepting only two rental car operators, its means of 
achieving this object was the use of its dominant position to exclude competitors of the 
successful concessionaires. The collateral contracts therefore had the purpose of excluding 
other potential concessionaires. 
I emphasise that ARA does not necessarily have to accept any applicant for a rental car 
concession, including Budget. The availability of space, level of service proposed for the 
public and other considerations will operate as reasonable constraints. 
However, McGechan J and RG Blunt in Union Shipping v Port Nelson Ltct'2 
hesitated "to incorporate the entire doctrine "as is" into New Zealand competition law at 
[that] point".43 They emphasised that their decision did not rest upon an essential 
facilities doctrine.44 Their main points of concern were the distinctively American social, 
commercial and constitutional setting, the background of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act 1890 and the fact that the doctrine was yet to be tested before the United States 
40 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd (1987] 2 NZLR 647 (HC); 
The Auckland Regional Authority (ARA) is the body responsible for, and in charge of, administration and 
the operation of Auckland International Airport. A vis and Hertz are holders of licences granted to them by 
the ARA to provide and operate rental vehicle services at the airport. The ARA granted the licences to both 
companies as successful tenderers. The ARA granted the licences on a "two only" basis to obtain the 
maximum income for the airport. Budget, a competitor not recognised, was challenging that decision. 
41 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 680 
(HC) Barker J. 
42 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662 (HC); Prior to 1 October 1988 the Nelson 
Harbour Board had a monopoly of mobile equipment and drivers on the wharves at the Port of Nelson. 
After the privatisation Port Nelson Ltd granted licenses to use the port which included clauses that required 
users to use the equipment of Port Nelson Ltd or pay higher levies. 
43 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, above, 705 (HC), McGechan J and RG Blunt. 
44 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, above, 711 (HC), McGechan J and RG Blunt. 
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Supreme Court. The Courts should interpret and apply the New Zealand Commerce Act 
1986 rather than import a common law doctrine. Therefore, the starting point has to be 
section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986.45 Nevertheless, the court held that "[t)he 
American experience may give valuable insight, and assists assessment of potential 
section 36 solutions".46 Since then the courts have maintained that cautious attitude 
towards the essential facilities doctrine. 
F Interrelation 
The interrelation of the different jurisdiction can be seen in the chart on the next page. 
The United States has an influence on the other jurisdiction in so far as the doctrine was 
invented there. While Australia normally has a significant influence on New Zealand, this 
is different in the area of the essential facilities doctrine. Australia has no more influence 
than Europe in terms of a general tendency to harmonisation and the recognition of 
certain principles. However, Europe has a huge influence on Germany.47 
45 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, above, 705 (HC), McGechan J and RG Blunt. 
46 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, above, 705 (HC), McGechan J and RG Blunt. 
47 These relationships between the different contries are mostly one-sided. The is hardly any influence on 
the USA. Europe is not influenced by Australia and New Zealand. Germany has an influence on the 
European development to the extend only that it can influence the decision making process. 
Australia 
III DEFINITION 
Interrelation 
United 
States 
Very strong influence because of the legal system 
Strong influence in some parts; tendency for harmonisation 
Recognition of concepts and ideas, otherwise only weak links 
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Interference of the process of competition in the marketplace should be restricted 
to the absolute minimum necessary to restrict failures of the market to allocate resources 
effectively. The rules for interventions should be clear and consistent so market conduct 
is not influenced by uncertainty.48 These are the expectations the doctrine has to fulfil. 
Therefore, to apply the essential facilities doctrine properly and assess its value the courts 
or competition authorities need a proper definition of it. Nevertheless, to give such a 
definition is a very hard task. One will not find any case that provides a consistent 
48 Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to Essential Facilities in Australia " 28 ABLR 325, 
327. 
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rationale for the doctrine or that explores the social costs and benefits or the 
administrative costs ofrequiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival.49 
Although it is complicated enough to find a workable definition of the essential 
facilities doctrine within one jurisdiction, it is even harder to find a definition that fits as a 
general concept for application in different jurisdictions. To illustrate the difficulties, one 
has to take into consideration the different criteria that have evolved over the time in 
different jurisdictions. 
A United States of America 
The United States antitrust laws are focused on the prevention of someone 
creating or defending a monopoly. However, the charging of monopoly prices is not 
prohibited. Therefore, a company can charge whatever it likes to make profits with its 
position in the market. That had led to the criteria of the MCI case mentioned above. 50 
B Europe 
Europe on the other hand, wants to prevent the abuse of a dominant position. To 
achieve this goal, the courts recognise three requirements that have to be fulfilled to grant 
an access right to the facility in question: 51 
(1) The facility, an infrastructure or infrastructure in combination with services, 
must be complementary to an economic activity in a related but separate 
market. Goods and immaterial property may only in exceptional cases be 
considered essential facilities. 
49 Phillip Areeda "Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles" (1990) 58 ALJ 841. 
50 The criteria of the MCI case are: 
( 1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
(2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
( 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 
51 Mats A. Bergmann "The role of the essential facilities doctrine" (Summer 2001) The Antitrust Bulletin 
403,409. 
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(2) Competing firms lack a realistic ability to duplicate the facility. 
(3) Access to the facility is necessary in order to compete in the related market. 
C Germany 
Germany's criteria for the access to an essential facility are now regulated by 
statute in § 19 IV Nr. 4 GWB. According to this section, the requirements are: 
(1) A dominant market position; 
(2) Misuse of that position; 
(3) A network or infrastructure; 
( 4) Denial of access at all or under reasonable terms; 
(5) Impossibility to compete in an up- or downstream market without the access 
to the facility; and 
(6) No proof of unfeasibility. 
D Australia 
Australia has a special access regime in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 197 4 
that regulates the access to telecommunications networks. 52
 
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act now deals with the access to bottleneck 
facilities. Similar to the German system, these statutory provisions set the requirements 
for the access. The relevant section is section 44 G (2) of the Trade Practices Act. Its 
criteria have to be fulfilled before the National Competition Council (NCC) can make a 
suggestion to the designated Minister to declare the service. 
(1) Access (or increased access) to the service would promote competition in at 
least one market (whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the 
service; and 
52 The Telecommunications Act 1991 provided industry-specific regulation for the access to 
telecommunications networks already. The access to telecommunications networks will be dealt with later 
in Part VII of this paper. Hilmer Report, eh 11,245. 
(2) it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility; and 
(3) the facility is of national significance, 53 having regard to 
(a) the size of the facility; or 
(b) 
(c) 
the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or 
the importance of the facility to the national economy. 
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(4) access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health or 
safety; and 
(5) access to the service is not already subject of an effective access regime; and 
(6) access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public 
interest. 54 
However, if a service is not declared under Part IHA consideration may still need 
to be given to the possible application of section 46 of the Trade Practices Act. 
E Other Requirements 
The literature and commentators also tried to develop requirements that on the 
one hand promote competition but on the other hand limit the extensive use of the 
essential facilities doctrine. 
These additional requirements are to a certain extend interrelated. As the access 
right should be exceptional only this right should be granted only if the access for 
competing firms is expected to increase competition substantially.
55 Another concern 
expressed through an additional criterion is the effect an access right can have on future 
investments. The doctrine should typically not be applied if this were to reduce the 
incentives to engage in desirable activities. 
56 
53 This excludes local phenomena from being declared. 
54 The public interest could be the efficiency of competition and consumer benefits. 
55 Phillip Areeda "Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles" (1990) 58 ALJ 841; 
Mats A. Bergmann "The role of the essential facilities doctrine" (Summer 2001) The Antitrust Bulletin 
403, 410; Valentine Korah "Access to Essential Facilities under the Commerce Act in the Light of 
Experience in Australia, the European Union and the United States " (2000) 31 VUWLR 231. 
56 Phillip Areeda, above, 841 ; Mats A. Bergmann, above, 410; Valentine Korah , above, 231. 
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F Conclusion 
As a result, the essential facilities doctrine is not easily applied or defined, since 
even the creation of an extended list of criteria does not appear to capture all elements of 
the courts' considerations and the requirements remain very ambiguous. 57 
One possible definition could be that 
[an] "essential facility" is [ .. . ] a monopoly permitting the owner to reduce output and or 
service and charge monopoly prices, to the detriment of users and the economy as a 
whole. In addition, where the owner of the facility is also competing in markets that are 
dependent on access to the facility, the owner can restrict access to the facility to 
eliminate or reduce competition in the dependent markets . 58 
The European Commission defined an essential facility as "a facility or 
infrastructure, without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their 
customers".59 
Some facilities are understood to be essential in all the jurisdictions. These can be 
regarded as having natural monopoly characteristics.60 Those facilities can be seen as 
classic examples such as telecommunications networks, gas and water pipelines, railroad 
terminals and tracks, airports, ports and wharves. 
In more contentious cases a lot more effort is necessary to justify the access to a 
certain facility. Such cases include a rock impresario seeking admission to the local 
auditorium61 ; a teletype machine marketer complaining that its competitor will not sell 
machines for it62 ; a ski resort complaining that a rival resort will not engage in joint 
57 Mats A. Bergmann, above, 413 . 
58 Hilmer Report, eh 11 , 239. 
59 B & J Line pie v Sea/ink Harbours Ltd and Sea/ink Stena Ltd (Case IV 34.174) [1992] 5 CMLR 255 . 
60 It will be analysed in Part VI D 1 of this paper if this is a necessary or sufficient requirement. 
6 1 Flip Side Prods., Inc V Jam Prods. , Ltd, 843 F 2d 1024 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 261 (1988). 
62 Oly mpia Equip. Leasing Co v Western Union Tel Co, 797 F 2d 370 (7'" Cir 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 
1574 (1987). 
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marketing with it
63
; a maker of "muscle building" food supplements demanding that a 
muscle building magazine accepts its adds64, a would-be oil seller, who has no storage 
tanks of his or her own demanding to use those of an incumbent seller65 or Berkey, who 
wants to know the results of Kodak's research before Kodak markets its own 
innovations66. 
This illustrates that the term of essential facilities can be misleading. The term is 
not used, or at least not only, for the provision of elementary requirements such as fresh 
water, health care and education. Instead, the term essential is rather used in the way of 
being indispensable to enable competition. 
IV DESIRABILITY 
The key question to answer, before the different criteria of the essential facilities 
doctrine are examined, is, if it is really desirable to grant a competitor an access right to a 
facility another competitor owns to enable competition in a downstream market. 
It is very understandable, from the point of view of a small company that an 
acces§. right seems like the best solution to enable competition in a certain market with a 
"big player" that might even be a monopolist. For example, if a small 
telecommunications company wants to compete with a nation-wide operating 
telecommunications company that has all the telecommunications lines and facilities 
avaiiable to provide millions of people with telecommunications services, the small 
company can only do so if it can use the existing lines. If the small business wants to 
compete in a niche of the market like international or long distance calls it is impossible 
to build a network of its own and still be able to make profits. 
On the other hand, the big company might have taken risks and large investments 
to build a network of its own. Therefore, a balance between the different needs has to be 
63 Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985). 
64 Twin Laboratories, Inc v Weider Health & Fitness Corp, 720 F Supp 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
65 Florida Fuels, Inc v Belcher Oil Co, 717 F Supp 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
66 Berkey Photo v Eastman Kodak Co. 603 F 2d 263 (2d Cir 1979), cert. denied, 444 US 1063 (1980). 
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struck. The need to access a certain existing facility instead of building a new one to 
enable competition is one demand. The recognition of fundamental rights and freedoms 
as well as the incentives to invest are the opposing needs. 
One has to realise and bear in mind that it is a general rule that the law does not 
impose a duty on one person to deal with another. Instead, owners of property and/ or 
suppliers of services are free to transact with others when, and in a manner, they choose. 
However, when a monopoly is involved, freedom to contract must be balanced against 
the possible misuse of market power. 67 
Striking that balance, one has to consider that at least in Germany the freedom of 
contract and the right to decide about ones property, which also includes businesses, have 
constitutional rank. Article 2 of the German Basic Law establishes the freedom of 
contract. Article 14 of the German Basic Law grants the freedom of property. As a result, 
these rights are not to be easily set aside. To rule against these fundamental freedoms the 
court must have sufficient justification. 
The German legislator defined the relationship between the purpose of 
competition law and the basic freedoms. With the enactment of § 19 IV Nr.4 GWB the 
German legislator defined the content of the rights in question. As the legislator gave a 
general definition and was not only regulating a single case this is consistent with 
German constitutional law. 68 
Nevertheless, the courts, not only in jurisdictions without a general access rule to 
essential facilities but also in jurisdictions like Germany and Australia that enacted 
special provisions, have to take the objectives of competition law into account. This is 
advisable because of the real infringement an access right may have. The possible harm 
caused has to be as moderate as possible.It has to be outweighed by the possible effects 
on competition. 
67 Hilmer Report, eh 11, 242; Brenda Marshall/ Rachael Mulheron "Access to 'Essential Facilities' under 
Part JI/A of the Trade Practices Act: Implementing the Legislative Regime" (1998) BOND LR 99, 102. 
68 Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung eines Grundrechts ( definition of the content and the boundaries of a 
basic right). 
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A Objectives of Competition Law 
The objectives of competition law m general and the provisions about access 
rights to essential facilities in particular are the promotion of competition, economic 
growth and efficiency. 69 The main goal of granting access rights to essential facilities is 
to secure competition in up- or downstream markets.70 
The objectives of competition law are stated, for example, in section 1 (A) of the 
Commerce Act 1986 that defines the purpose of the Act as to promote competition in the 
markets for the long-term benefit of consumers in New Zealand. 
Further, § 1 GWB prohibits any agreement between competing undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerned practices, which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
The object of the Australian regulation of the Trade Practices Act 1974, as stated 
m section 2, is to enhance the welfare of the Australians through the promotion of 
competition and fair trading and provision of consumer protection. Part IIIA in particular 
is also concerned with how best to promote competition71 and is based on the notion that 
competition, efficiency and public interest are increased by overriding the exclusive 
rights of the owners of 'monopoly' facilities to determine the terms and conditions on 
which they will supply their services. 72 
Article 3 (I) (g) of the EC Treaty seeks to provide a system ensunng that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted. Article 82 (II) (b) of the EC Treaty 
prohibits the limitation of production, market or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers. This illustrates that consumer protection and benefits are essential goals for 
competition law to achieve and promote. 
69 Commentary by the Commerce Select Committee, "Penalties, Remedies and Court Processed Under the 
Commerce Act 1986", 7 February 2001, 5. 
70 Volker Emmerich Kartellrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Mi.inchen, 2001) 202; Justification of§ 19 IV 
Nr.4 GWB by the German Government, BT-Drs. 13/9720, 73 . 
71 Frank Zumbo "Access to Essential Facilities in Australia " (Feb. 2000) NZLR 13. 
72 Re Australian Union of Students [1997] ATPR 41 ,473 at 43,956 - 43,957. 
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B Implications of an Access Right 
However, one always has to bear in mind that the essential facilities doctrine is 
"not an independent tool of analysis but only a label - a label that beguiles some 
commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal without analysing the 
implications".73 The justification in terms of competition policy for interfering with a 
dominant undertaking's freedom of contract often requires a careful balancing of 
conflicting considerations. 74 
The implications that one has to take into account when deciding on granting an 
access right are the repercussions for investment. A regulator or court also has to decide 
whether the goal is short-term promotion of competition or the long-term benefit of 
consumers through competition. 
The goal of short-term competition can obviously be achieved through an access 
right for an applicant to an existing facility of another competitor. However, a considerate 
and thoughtful analyst will not stop at that point of the analysis. The further questions to 
ask are: 
(1) What are the signals that are sent to the competitor that owns the facility that 
another competitor is now able to access? 
(2) What are the considerations of other companies that think about an investment 
in a certain facility? 
(3) What is the outcome for long-term innovation? 
73 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 1987 supplement to Areeda and Turner on Antitrust Law 
(1978) 655, 656; Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662, 704 (HC), McGechan J 
and RG Blunt. 
74 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998 ([1998] ECR 1-7791) para 57. 
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1 What are the signals that are sent to the competitor that owns the facility that 
another competitor is now able to access? 
Concerning question one, the owner of that facility will not be very pleased to 
grant the other competitor an access right. The owner took all the risks of a sometimes 
huge investment to build a network or facility. This happened because of a calculation of 
the risks and the possible profits to gain if the investment is successful. Introducing a new 
variable of another competitor that is able to access the established facility without the 
risks spoils this calculation. Chances are that profits are lower under these new 
circumstances. 75 
2 What are the considerations of other companies that think about an investment 
in a certain facility? 
This leads straight to question two. It could be argued that the competitor knew 
before that this might happen. Therefore, other companies or the owner of the company 
who has to grant an access right from an ex ante perspective must think about the 
possible implications of their successful investment. If the company takes a risk and is 
successful it could well be that someone else is going to free-ride. If a company is 
considering an investment in a laboratory, plant or other facility it might choose the 
option of taking less risk and investment. If the facility is too big and has spare capacities 
for future developments a competitor might demand access to that facility. As a result, an 
investor will only opt for facilities with spare capacities if the compensation for a 
possible access right is carefully balanced. The need for enhanced competition on one 
hand has to be balanced against the needs of the owner of a facility to generate profits 
from its business. 
75 A market analysis before the start of a business has difficulties to assess that risk. Such an analysis can 
try to predict the demand and therefore the time until the business generates profits. Credit lines are 
calculated on that basis. These credits are likely to be more expensive if they run over a longer period of 
time to cover lower profits in the case of an access right. 
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3 What is the outcome for long-term innovation? 
This is interrelated with question three. If a company opts for the smaller facility 
it might not be able to do research and come up with innovations. The argument against 
such an assumption could be that a company has no choice but to produce innovations. A 
company that is not producing innovations and is not able to present new products to the 
customer will not perform very well in the future. However, this is only true if 
competitors of that company are able to take over market shares, which is prevented if 
they cannot access the facility. 76 As a result, the incentives to do research are minimised 
if there is no risk of competitors taking away customers. This would definitely harm 
consumer benefits in the long-run. 
4 Conclusion 
Thus, if access to a producing, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too 
easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus 
while competition was increased in the short-term it would be reduced in the long-term. 
Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would 
be reduced if its competitor were, upon request, able to share the benefits. A company 
might still be able to make profits without improvement to its products. However, this 
would not be in the best interest of the customers. Therefore, in the long-term it is 
generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a company to retain 
for its own use facilities, which it has developed for the purpose of its business. As a 
consequence, the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant 
undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to it. 
All this has to be taken into account when it comes to the assessment of the 
different criteria of the essential facilities doctrine. This doctrine can be a viable tool to 
determine the facility that need to be accessed if these concerns and repercussions for the 
economy as a whole are borne in mind. 
76 It will be analysed later if a competitor can exclude another when there are no spare capacities or if the 
owner of the essential facility has to promote the business of the other competitor through investments, 
changes in the facility and the extension of the facility. 
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V DIFFERENT REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The different jurisdictions approach the issue of access rights to essential facilities 
in a different way. Germany and Australia have special provisions for certain network 
facilities, a special rule for essential facilities in general and a general rule to fall back on 
that regulates the misuse of market power. 
Europe has special provisions for access to essential facilities to a certain extend 
only. 
New Zealand on the other hand, tackles the problem through the general rule of 
the misuse of market power alone. 77 
A Australia 
The Australian regulatory approach concerning different essential facilities is very 
diverse. Australia has a three-stage system. 
In the first stage, Australia enacted special regulatory regimes that regulate 
comprehensively thorough access to certain facilities. Such regimes exist in the form of, 
for example, the National Electricity Market Access Code and the Natural Gas Access 
Code. Access to telecommunications networks can be seen as being on the same level 
with these regimes. Instead of a special access regime, the access to these networks is 
regulated and incorporated in the Trade Practices Act as Part XIC.78 
The second stage of access regulation forms Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. 
This part provides general provisions for the granting of an access right. An access right 
may be granted for a declared service. The NCC and the designated minister have to be 
convinced that the relevant requirements are met before they can take the necessary steps 
to declare a service. These requirements are: 
77 An exception is the Telecommunications Commissioner under the Telecommunications Act 2001 that I 
will refer to later in this paper. 
78 As mentioned earlier (note 48), the access to telecommunication networks used to be regulated in the 
Telecommunications Act 1991 . 
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(1) First, the relevant service has to be identified. The service has to meet the 
definition of section 44 B of the Trade Practices Act. 79 
(2) Secondly, the requirements of section 44 G (2)80 have to be fulfilled before the 
National Competition Council (NCC) can make a suggestion to the designated 
Minister to declare the service. 
(3) Thirdly, the Minister declares the service. 
(4) Fourthly, the parties can either negotiate the terms of access themselves and 
register their agreement with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) or the ACCC is empowered to arbitrate the dispute. 
The third stage within the Australian system of access rights to essential facilities 
is the general rule of section 46 of the Trade Practices Act. This section covers the taking 
advantage of a substantial degree of market power. 
79 "service" means a service provided by means of a facility and includes: 
(a) the use of an Infrastructure facility such as a road or railway line; 
(b) handling or transporting things such as goods or people; 
(c) a communications service or similar service; 
but does not include: 
( d) the supply of goods; or 
( e) the use of intellectual property; or 
(t) the use of a production process; 
except to the extent that it is an integral but subsidiary part of the service. 
80 Section 44 G (2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 holds: 
(a) Access (or increased access) to the service would promote competition in at least one market 
(whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the service; and 
(b) it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility; and 
(c) the facility is of national significance, having regard to 
(i) the size of the facility; or 
(ii) the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or 
(iii) the importance of the facility to the national economy. 
( d) access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health or safety; and 
(e) access to the service is not already subject ofan effective access regime; and 
(t) access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public interest. 
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B Germany 
The German legislator has established a similar system to the Australian one. 
However, there are only two different stages that can be distinguished in Germany. 
On the first level, special regimes, comparable to the Australian special access 
regimes, exist to regulate the access to certain facilities in a comprehensive manner. 
These statutes are the Telekommunikationsgesetz (Telecommunications Act - later 
referred to as TKG) of 1996, the Postgesetz (Postal Services Act - later referred to as 
PostG) of 1997, the Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz (General Railroad Act - later referred 
to as AEG) of 1993 and the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Energy Act - later referred to as 
EnWG) of 1998. 
Enforcement of the different Acts vanes. Special industry specific regulators 
enforce the TKG, the PostG and the AEG. The statutory body responsible for the access 
of competitors to networks in the area of the TKG and the PostG is the 
Regulierungsbehorde fiir Telekommunikation und Post in Bonn. 81 The reform of the 
railroad legislation with the AEG of 27 December 1993 the Eisenbahnbundesamt was 
established as an industry specific regulator that enforces the Act in the area of railroad 
services. 82 
The situation within the energy sector is exceptional in terms of enforcement of 
the En WG. Enforcement of the Act is not the responsibility of a specific statutory body 
but rather is placed in the hands of the industry itself. 83 Following the German tradition in 
this area the necessary decisions are implemented in special association agreements. 
84 
81 REGTP ,,Die Regulierungsbehorde" http://www. regtp. de/behoerde/ start/ in O 1-00-00-00-
00 m/index.html (Last accessed 2 August 2002) 
82 Rudolf Biermann "Die Benutzung der Eisenbahninfrastrukturen durch Eisenbahnverkehrsunternehmen " 
(1998) 25 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1846. 
83 Hanna Schroeder "Selbstregulierente Netzzugangsorganisation als Marktzutrittsschranke im deutschen 
Energiewirtschaftsrecht" 
http://www. iura. uos. de/prof/ schneider/Downl oadsN ortraege/SeminarGreifs waldN etzzugang. pdf (Last 
accessed 2 August 2002). 
84 Verbiindevereinbarung Gas (Association Agreement Gas), Verbiindevereinbarung II (Association 
Agreement ff), Nachtrag (Amendment) and Verbiindevereinbarung II plus (Association Agreement If plus). 
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The competition authority (Bundeskartellamt) and the Ministry of Commerce supervise 
these agreements. If they are not satisfied with the way the industry is regulating itself 
they can put pressure on the industry to enact better regulations. 
In the second stage § 19 GWB regulates the misuse of a dominant position. The 
access to networks and infrastructures is regulated in § 19 IV Nr.4 GWB as a special case 
of that misuse. However, it is still possible to assess the circumstances under § 19 I 
GWB, which is the general rule that deals with misuse of a dominant position if the 
special case is not applicable because the requirements set out are not met. 
C Europe 
Europe has not established a special regulatory system like Germany and 
Australia as telecommunications and railroads are administered by the Member States. 85 
The articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty are the only provisions that deal with the issue of 
access rights. These provisions tend to be construed in a restrictive manner. 86 
D New Zealand 
New Zealand has chosen a different system from Germany and Australia but can 
be compared with the European approach. New Zealand uses so-called "light-handed 
regulation". This must not be mistaken as little or even absence of regulation at all. 87 The 
term means that New Zealand did not establish an industry specific regulator but relies on 
competition and the threat of regulation. The only exception so far is the 
Telecommunications Commissioner established by the Telecommunications Act 2001. In 
general, section 36, Commerce Act 1986, that deals with the abuse of power, has to 
This is regarded as the best solution to process the requests for access of about 800 network operators in 
Germany in relative proximity of the applications. Boris Scholtka "Die Entwicklung des Energierechts in 
den Jahren 2000 und 2001 " (2002) 7 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 483 . 
85 However, the European legislator set the regulatory framework for the Member States to act in. This will 
be illustrated for the telecommunication industry in Part VII of this paper. 
86 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998 ([1998) ECR I-7791) para 68; see also 
Bronner ECJ, ([1998) ECR I-7791) para 46. 
87 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 2001 Competition Law Update 3. 
30 
ensure that economic efficiency prevails. The courts have the potential to create an access 
right in circumstances where the regulatory function of the markets has failed. 
E Assessment 
Both systems, the light-handed approach of New Zealand and the establishment of 
industry specific regulators in Germany and Australia, work according to the specific 
needs within the different jurisdictions. Therefore, the assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages is only possible in relation to the different circumstances within the 
different countries. 
The establishment of an industry specific regulator can have various incentives. 
One of the reasons for a legislator to establish a special regulator is the need to 
have an expert authority to deal with a very complex issue. Especially in 
telecommunications issues a lot of technical knowledge is necessary to administer the 
system in a way that allows lively competition and still does not disadvantage anyone. 
One only has to think about the frequencies that are involved for TV broadcastings, 
radiocommunications, and landbased telephone line or satellite connections. All this has 
to be regulated for many different providers. In big markets with many participants like in 
Australia and Germany the courts would not be capable of dealing with the granting of 
licences and frequencies by themselves. The courts could manage this task only if they 
had the necessary resources. 88 However, to call several experts to testify each time would 
generate immense costs and would make lawsuits even more expensive. 89 As a result, the 
complexity and size of certain industries in different jurisdictions make an industry 
specific regulator almost indispensable. 
Predictability is another advantage of taking that task away from the courts and 
regulating this issue by statute in order to concentrate the responsibility in the hands of 
88 However, one has to take into account that the industry specific regulator for the German 
telecommunications and postal services area alone employs several hundred full-time staff members. To 
leave this regulation for the courts to sort out is hardly imaginable. 
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the regulator. All regulatory regimes have in common that competitors are encouraged to 
solve problems on their own. To accomplish this and to solve the question of access 
rights to certain facilities it is easier for all parties involved if there are guidelines to 
follow. The regulator takes actions to decide on that issue only ifthere is no solution for a 
problem. 
On the other hand, in jurisdictions like New Zealand with only relatively small 
markets the costs of the establishment of an industry specific regulator have to be 
balanced against the costs of experts testifying in a case before ajudge.90 In New Zealand 
with only a few companies in positions of interest in relation to access rights it would be 
"overkill" to have a regulatory body that is responsible for the supervision of 
competition. The newly established Telecommunications Commissioner under the 
Telecommunications Act 2001 is a slight exception to that. However, this new authority 
deals mainly with technical issues though the Commissioner is also acting as 
intermediary where an agreement cannot be found between parties. For the few cases that 
might arise the costs of an expert testifying are justifiable in comparison to the costs that 
might be involved in the establishment of a regulator. It "costs the country less in terms 
of both compliance costs to business and cost to the taxpayer of funding the regime". 9 1 
Another valid concern that influences the establishment of an industry specific 
regulator is the possible familiarity of an industry specific regulator with the sector of the 
economy that has to be regulated. While a rotation of personnel within competition 
authorities is common practice to secure independence of the authority generally no 
rotation takes place in a special regulatory body. Within the sector that has to be 
monitored the persons involved get to know each other very well. This could give rise to 
bias concerns. To counter thses concerns safeguards have to be established. 
89 The effected companies would try to calculate the risk of an expensive law suit in advance to recover the 
possible losses through higher prices. This would be to the detriment of consumers. 
90 Although these experts can be very costly. As an example the case of Telecom v Clear involved two 
economists and one accountant on the side of Clear and three professors and one accountant on the side of 
Telecom in the High Court. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 
NZLR 385, 397 (PC), Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
9 1 Commerce Commision Media Release: 1998-58, 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/publications/display rnr.cfm?rnr id=4 l 7 (Last accessed 20 May 2002). 
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Another circumstance that can influence the decision of a legislator in terms of 
light-handed regulation or an industry specific regulator is the political attitude towards 
legislation. Germany lives up to the stereotype of being overly correct and keen to 
regulate everything as thoroughly as possible. Trust in the markets is not very strong. 
New Zealand on the other hand, has a strong belief in market forces and chooses a liberal 
"laissez-faire" -approach. 
As a consequence, the light-handed approach as well as the regulatory approach is 
justifiable under different market circumstances. However, in jurisdictions that are very 
sceptical about the application of the essential facilities doctrine like New Zealand, as 
well as in jurisdictions that enacted statutory provisions dealing with the access issue, the 
doctrine is only a tool the courts or legislators use. 
VI CRITERIA OF ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO THE ESSENTIAL 
F AC/LIT/ES DOCTRINE 
As mentioned above, the essential facilities doctrine and the criteria set up to 
analyse a case according to the doctrine differ to a considerable extent. The emphasis in 
the US antitrust system is on the prevention of monopolies or their defence once a 
monopoly is established. Other jurisdictions like Europe, Germany, New Zealand and 
Australia focus on the use or misuse or a dominant market position. Nevertheless, some 
common ground and certain common features to start from can be identified. They form a 
set of criteria to describe a behaviour that is deemed anti-competitive. Criteria that appear 
one way or another throughout all jurisdictions are: 
1.) The facility has to be a network, infrastructure or relevant service. 
2.) The facility has to be in a dominant position or a monopolist (or have 
substantial market power). 
3.) The facility has to be impossible to duplicate within reasonable limits. 
4.) The owner of the facility has to deny the access at all or under reasonable 
terms. 
5.) The facility has to be necessary to enable up- or downstream competition. 
6.) Sharing the facility has to be feasible in terms of security and competence 
of the applicant. Further, the business of the owner must not be put at risk. 
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A Network, Infrastructure or Relevant Service 
That the facility has to be a network or infrastructure is an explicit requirement of 
§ 19 IV Nr.4 GWB. Section 44 B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 on the other hand 
mentions a relevant service. Europe and New Zealand in their general rules do not 
mention a specific description the facility has to fulfil. However, the difference between 
the requirements in the different states is not very big. The concepts of networks and 
infrastructures are wide enough to cover almost everything. Examples that are covered 
are airport terminals, electronic reservation systems, railroad tracks and terminals, 
databases and even camera spots at the funeral of a British princess. 92 
Within section 44 B of the Trade Practices Act 197 4 infrastructure facilities such 
as a road or railway line, the handling or transporting of things such as goods or people 
and communications services are covered. 
Excluded from the relevant services are the supply of goods, the use of 
intellectual property and the use of a production process. Clearly, since the focus of Part 
IIIA is on the provision of a service, any of the above-mentioned is only relevant to the 
extent that it is necessary for gaining access to the primary service. Importantly, while 
Part IIIA does not cover a service that does not fall within the definition of service, 
consideration may still need to be given to the possible application of section 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act. 93 
The same is true for the German application of the essential facilities doctrine. § 
19 IV Nr.4 s.2 GWB explicitly excludes intellectual property rights. The reason for the 
exclusion of these rights is the balance the legislator has to find between promotion of 
research and innovations on one hand and the promotion of competition through granting 
access rights on the other hand. The protection of an invention through a patent enables 
the inventor to recover the costs of his/ her research to produce that invention. Therefore, 
other companies or individuals are encouraged to research as well. This is for the benefit 
92 Volker Enunerich Karte!lrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Milnchen, 2001) 201; Meinrad Dreher, "Die 
Verweigerung des Zugangs zu einer wesentlichen Einrichtung als Missbrauch der Marktbeherrschung" 
(1999) 16 DB 833, 834. 
93 Frank Zumbo "Access to Essential Facilities in Australia" (Feb. 2000) NZLR 13, 14. 
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of society and the consumer as well. Additional benefits for consumers can be gained 
after the period of 20 years of protection. New innovations are often based on older 
patents. Therefore, the access to intellectual property rights has to be restricted for a 
certain period of time as benefits for consumers would be realisable only in the short-run 
while in the long-run disadvantages would nullify the gained benefits. 
The European approach to intellectual property rights is slightly different. This is 
illustrated by the decision of"Magill". 94 
This behaviour of the big TV broadcasters in the UK and Ireland was regarded as 
misuse of their intellectual property rights, which meant their copyrights. These rights 
were so short-lived that after the protection period there was no use for them anymore. 
The circumstance that consumers in the UK and Ireland had to buy one TV guide for 
each channel was regarded as intolerable. 
As a result, intellectual property rights are covered by the European approach to 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine under very exceptional circumstances 
only. 
B Dominant Position or Monopolist 
The next question to be answered is the amount of market power that an owner of 
a facility in question has to have to regard his or her behaviour as intolerable when 
refusing to deal or provide access under reasonable conditions for a competitor. 
The United States' requirement is that the owner has to be a monopolist. Europe 
and Germany have the criteria of the dominant position in their provisions of § 19 GWB 
and article 82 of the EC Treaty. Australia does not refer to this problem in Part IHA but in 
94 ECJ, Judgement of 6 April 1995, Cases C-241 /91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v 
Commision [1995] ECR I-743; In that case, the three main briadcasters in Ireland, Radio Telefis Eireann 
(RTE), Independent Television Publications (ITP) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), refused 
to release their programme listings to Magill TV Guide, so that it could publish a weekly TY guide 
comprising all listings. Unedr Irish and UK law, the programme listings were copyrighted. Each one of 
these broadcasters was publishing its own guide with its respective listings only. 
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the general rule that is applicable if the access right cannot be achieved through Part IHA 
it also has the substantial degree of market power requirement. In New Zealand, the 
criteria was dominance, but is now a substantial degree of market power. 
1 Market Definition 
No matter what the requirement for the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine is, the definition of the market is crucial. For competition law purposes, the 
market is the theoretical construct where firms interact. Put broadly, it encompasses the 
smallest geographical area where products are close substitutes. 95 
Mason CJ and Wilson J emphasised the importance of the definition of the 
relevant market in Queensland Wire in the following way: 96 
After identifying the appropriate product level, it is necessary to describe accurately the 
parameters of the market in which the defendant 's product competes: too narrow a 
description of the market will create the appearance of more market power than in fact 
exists; too broad a description will create the appearance of less market power than there 
IS . 
The European approach as common ground for the jurisdictions under scrutiny is 
helpful in this context. The ECJ held in Hoffmann-LaRoche97 that: 
[t]he concept of the relevant market [ ... ] implies that there can be effective competition 
between the products which form part of it and this presupposes that there is a sufficient 
degree of interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same market in 
so far as a specific use of such products is concerned. 
95 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 200 I Competition Law Update I 6. 
96 Queensland Wire Industries Proprieta,y Limited v Th e Broken Hill Proprietary Company limited and 
another [1988-1989] 167 CLR 177, 187 (HCA), Mason CJ and Wilson J. 
97 Hoffmann-La Roche AG v The Commission of the European Communities [1979] I ECR, 461. 
Hoffmann-La Roche concluded agreements with its customers who purchased vitamins which contained an 
obligation upon them, or by the grant of fidelity rebates offer them an incentive, to buy all or most of their 
requirements exclusively, or in preference, from Hoffmann-La Roche. 
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This culminates in the question of substitutability. The New Zealand Law Society 
phrases it in the following way: 98 
It is a simple enough proposition to state, but somewhat more difficult to control in 
practice. At a superficial level it can be illustrated as follows. A consumer goes to the shop 
to buy an apple and discovers the price has increased. Is an orange purchased in 
substitution? If the answer to that is yes, it may indicate there is a broader market for fruit. 
But, if a banana is wanted in order to bake a banana cake, an orange will not be an 
adequate substitute. 
From the approach of an economist the test of substitutability is about cross-
elasticity of supply and demand. This measures the extent to which supply or demand 
conditions alter if the price of a substitute product alters. 
Dawson Jin Queensland Wire99 put it like this: 
The basic test involves the ascertainment of the cross-elasticities of both supply and 
demand, that is to say, the extent to which the supply of or demand for a product 
responds to a change in the price of another product. Cross-elasticities of supply and 
demand reveal the degree to which one product may be substituted for another, an 
important consideration in any definition of a market. 
If demand is described as inelastic it means that demand is unresponsive to an 
increase in price. It simply remains the same. 
2 Monopolist 
The question to be decided once the relevant market is defined is whether the 
competitor in the market needs to be a monopolist for there to be an obligation to grant 
someone an access right. 
98 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 2001 Competition Law Update 17. 
99 Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and 
another (1988-1989] 167 CLR 177, 199 (HCA) Dawson J. 
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a Necessary Condition 
In the United States the MCI case that established the four criteria for the essential 
facilities doctrine in the United States required the owner of the facility in question to be 
a monopolist. As mentioned above, the legal and historical background has to be taken 
into account when it comes to the interpretation and analysis of the doctrine in different 
jurisdictions. The US American antitrust law is concerned with the prohibition of the 
establishment and maintenance of monopolies. This stems from their historical 
expenence with omnipotent trusts that thwarted competition to the detriment of 
consumers. 
The regulations in force in the four other jurisdictions that deal with the essential 
facilities doctrine explicitly or through their general rules do not require the facility to be 
a monopolistic one. The focus is based on market power that has to be substantia1 100 or 
establishes a dominant position 1° 1. 
As a result, it is not necessary that a monopolist owns the facility that is regarded 
as being essential. 
b Sufficient Condition 
To say that the facility does not necessarily have to be owned by a monopolist for 
the essential facilities doctrine to be applicable does not rule out that the monopoly 
position still could be sufficient condition for the essential facilities doctrine to be 
applied. 
To consider a monopoly position as sufficient for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine would imply that this market position on its own is blameworthy. 
However, a monopoly position in a market is not enough on its own to force a competitor 
to open his or her facility for another competitor. This would leave the forces of the 
market out of consideration. The law does not condemn every monopolist simply because 
100 Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Australia; Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 in New 
Zealand. 
101 § 19 IV Nr.4 GWB in Germany; Article 82 of the EC Treaty. 
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he is a monopolist in order to "reshuffle" the market. 102 Not even in the United States 
where the wilful acquisition under sec 2 of the Sherman Act is the position of a 
monopolist enough to take actions against him or her. A competitor that uses innovation, 
service and other forces of competition in a market to deny other competitors market 
shares cannot be subject to an action against him or her. This is because this kind of 
behaviour is intended by competition law.103 
If this is true in the United States it is also true in the other jurisdictions m 
question because the threshold of market power is lower than in the United States. 
As a result, a monopoly position of a competitor might be an indication that 
further investigations concerning his or her business practices in relation to the access to 
certain facilities could be advisable. Nevertheless, this position itself is not enough to 
trigger any kind of access right. 
C Involvement of the State 
As some of the networks m question like telecommunications networks, 
electricity grids or railroad terminals and tracks were formerly state owned, the question 
is if this circumstance could be a sufficient or even necessary condition to apply the 
essential facilities doctrine. 
The problem with state involvement in the competition process is that competitors 
are not treated equally. This is a valid concern. However, the commentators critical of 
regulation of network industries relate more to an evolving industry when everyone is out 
of the blocks at the same time rather than a market with a dominant incumbent as a result 
f . . . f d 1 i o4 o pnvatlsatlon o a state-owne monopo y. 
102 Phillip Areeda "Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles" (1990) 58 ALJ 841 , 
845. 
103 "A monopolist is entitled, like everyone else, to compete with its competitors: if it is not permitted to do 
so it would be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors." Telecom v Clear Communications [1995] 
1 NZLR 385, 402 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Olympia Equip. Leasing Co v Western Union Tel Co, 797 
F 2d 370 (iii Cir 1986) Posner J. 
104 Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications Final Report (2000) 14, note 4. 
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An argument for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to grant a 
competitor an access right where a formerly state-owned now privatised monopolist is 
involved is that this player in the market was equipped with a network that was paid for 
by taxpayers. The risk of failure was placed on the state. Securing the monopoly by 
statutory regulation the competitor had the possibility to bind customers to his or her 
services. As these industries were established in areas that provided services for the 
essential requirements of the people these services are more than likely to cover all 
consumers. It is very difficult for a new entrant in the market to acquire market shares 
because of that. 
On the other hand, one could argue that this advantage was equalised when the 
monopolist was privatised. The shares were sold at a price that the government saw fit to 
cover the value of the company. Therefore, one could say that the formerly state-owned 
enterprise is not different from any other business just started. Therefore, the result could 
be that the former state involvement should not be considered as the important factor in 
the decision of granting an access right or not. 
It is true that a government in the privatisation process tries to accomplish a price 
per share that reflects the true value of the company. Nevertheless, one has to take into 
consideration that some positions are not covered, like the possible losses from the 
beginning of the undertaking, the costs of innovation and the invaluable fact that because 
of the statutory monopoly position many customers were forced to use the services of that 
company. Although there might be competition now these customers might now be 
reluctant to change the service provider they know for a certain time. This could be 
because of the concern that the new provider is not as good as the old one, that changes 
might be involved or just because of laziness. As a conclusion, the former state 
involvement makes it more likely that an access right to certain essential facilities is 
justified. 
To assess the validity of this argument a comparison with the situation with a 
private competitor involved in the first place might provide valuable information. 
Two cases that might help answer the question of the indicative effect of former 
state involvement in comparison to private achievements are the Australian cases of 
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Queensland Wire and Me/way. The facts of Queensland Wire were already mentioned 
above. In the case of Me/way the Melway Street Directory held in excess of 80-90 per 
cent of the retail market share for Melbourne street directories. It could have arranged for 
the distribution of its street directories in a number of different ways. It decided to 
appoint independent wholesalers who were given exclusive responsibility for a particular 
segment of the market. Thus, newsagents and bookshops constituted one segment service 
stations and retail outlets for automotive parts constituted another segment. Selected 
wholesaler distributors were appointed exclusively for each defined market. While there 
was strong competition between retailers within a segment or across segments especially 
in relation to price, there was very little competition at the wholesale level. Melway 
cancelled one of the contracts with its distributors. 
Both cases involved a private company that took all the risk in the first place to 
establish a very costly facility in the hope of making profits one day. In the course of the 
events the facility proved profitable because other competitors did not take the risk to 
establish a competing facility themselves or if they did the products were not as 
successful. Therefore, the markets decided who is able to compete and who is not. In 
such a situation one has to be careful to establish an access right too readily. Therefore, 
less often has the doctrine been used when the monopoly position is the result of "skill, 
foresight and industry" - and nor should it be. 105 
On the other hand, the situation is different in the case of the purchase of shares of 
a former state-owned monopolist. The buyer gets an already established company with 
less risks involved. Though the price might be high it is unlikely that it reflects all the 
risks taken properly. 
As a result, while successful private competitors should be treated with careful 
consideration if not left alone altogether, the involvement of a former state-owned 
tos Mats A. Bergmann "The role of the essential facilities doctrine" (Summer 2001) The Antitrust Bulletin 
403, 405. The Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company 
Limited and another [1988-1989] 167 CLR 177 (HCA) case is an example for sucessful establishment ofa 
product. However, the essential facilities doctrine is not applicable because the Y-Bar is a product or good 
and no facility, network or infrastructure. 
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competitor has the same indicative consequences as monopolist status. While it is not 
enough on its own the state involvement triggers further investigation in the business 
practices of that company. 
D Impossibility of Duplication of the Facility 
Another condition that has to be fulfilled by the facility is that it has to be 
impossible to duplicate within reasonable terms. Uncertainties arise in relation to the term 
of natural monopolies and the point of view an authority or regulator or a court has to 
take when it decides about the impossibility to duplicate a facility. 
1 Natural Monopoly 
In the context of the impossibility of duplicating a certain facility, the term of 
natural monopolies, or facilities having natural monopoly characteristics, is often used. 
First of all, it is necessary to define what the term means and to decide if it provides a 
helpful tool in the application of the essential facilities doctrine. 
The National Competition Council (NCC) of Australia defines a natural 
monopoly as occurring where one facility can supply the entire market demand more 
cheaply than two or more smaller facilities. 106 
In Sydney International Airport the Tribunal considered that: 107 
The "power and salience" of a natural monopoly comes from, first, economies of scale; 
second, economies of scope, that is producing a number of different but complementary 
products at a comparatively low unit cost; and, third, the specialised nature of the assets, 
having no alternative economic value in use and therefore entailing costs on new entrants 
which are unrecoverable, or "sunk" in the event of subsequent exit. 
106 National Competition Council "The National Access Regime: A Draft Guide to Part ll!A of the Trade 
Practices Act" (NCC, Melbourne, 1996) 22. 
107 Sydney International Airport [2000] ACompT 1, 82. 
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In essence, a natural monopoly occurs in markets characterised by diminishing 
marginal costs and average costs over a relevant range of output, due to the existence of 
fixed costs for the delivery of the service. 108 
In circumstances like this, where high barriers to entry safeguard the present 
monopolist against competition, consumer benefits demand the legislator or courts to take 
actions. The success of braking up such natural monopolies is displayed in the German 
telecommunications sector. The prices for national and international calls are 
considerably lower now than they have been before the privatisation and the access of 
smaller competitors to the networks owned by the Telekom AG. 109 
2 Impossibility 
There are several options as to how to construe the requirement that it be 
impossible for a competitor to duplicate the facility. First of all, "impossibility" has to be 
defined. Further, the criteria can be assessed from an objective point of view as well as 
from a subjective one. Thirdly, a decision has to be made if impossibility of duplication 
has to be absolute or just relative. 
a Definition of Impossibility 
Impossibility of duplicating a facility can be defined as the mere inconvenience of 
raising enough money, to fulfil the legal requirements to get the necessary permits and to 
overcome any physical obstacles. On the other hand, it can have the meaning of an 
insurmountable barrier as well. 
108 Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to Essential Facilities in Australia" 28 ABLR 325, 
328. 
109 The introduction of the call-by-call option for long distance and international calls in the beginning of 
1998 led to a decrease of fees by 90%. Handelsblatt Mehr Wettbewerb im Telefon-Ortsnetz beschlossen 11 
September 2002 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/hbi wwwangebot?fn=relhbi&sfn=buildhbi&cn=GoArt! 200104,201197 ,56448 
.f (Last accessed 12 September 2002). 
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As mentioned above, became the essential facilities doctrine a very powerful tool 
in the hands of the competition authorities. It has to be applied with care. Therefore the 
Hilmer Committee considered that "clearly, the access to the facility should be essential, 
rather than merely inconvenient". 110 In other words, 111 
the dominant undertaking has [to have] a genuine stranglehold on the related market. That 
might be the case for example where duplication of the facility is impossible or extremely 
difficult owing to physical, geographic or legal constraints or is highly undesirable for 
reasons of public policy. 
This is in line with only exceptional circumstances justifying the application of 
the essential facilities doctrine. 
b Objective or Subjective Approach 
The next question to answer is, whether an objective or subjective approach 
should be applied to evaluate the potential of a competitor to duplicate a facility. To 
answer this question it is necessary to identify the objective of competition law in this 
context. 
Some argue that cases like Commercial Solventsll2 have involved situations 
where a small or medium-sized business, which was dependent on a particular supplier, 
saw its livelihood threatened. As a result, the objective of competition law could be seen 
as protection of a single competitor. 
The argument against this is the fact that in the Commercial Solvents case "it was 
the elimination of downstream competition with itself that made the refusal of supply [by 
110 Hilmer Report, eh. 11, p.251. 
111 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998 ([1998] ECR I-7791) para 65 . 
112 Commercial Solvents Corp v The Commission of the European Communities [1974] 1 CMLR 309; 
Commercial Solvents as the dominant manufacturer of certain chemical products, used in the production of 
drugs to combat tuberculosis, decided that it would no longer supply the products to other drug producers 
because it intended to produce the finished drugs itself. 
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Commercial Solvents] an abuse". 113 In Australia section 46 of the Trade Practices Act is 
concerned with free not fair competition114• This section "aims to promote competition, 
not the private interests of particular persons or corporations". 115 The approach is not 
different in the other jurisdictions. 11 6 Indeed, competition in general is often ruthless, 
stressful and unpredictable. 11 7 
Merely to focus on the inability of some entrants to raise sufficient capital in potentially 
imperfect financial markets is to focus subjectively on the competitor rather than 
objectively on the process of competition. 11 8 
As a consequence, it cannot be the aim of competition law in general and the 
essential facilities doctrine in particular to promote a competitor that made up his or her 
mind to compete with an existing market player when this new would-be entrant lacks all 
the necessary requirements. For the sake of recognising the fundamental freedoms of 
contract and property subjective difficulties of the competitor have to be set aside. Taking 
this into consideration the test has to be objective. 
c Absolute or Relative 
The last decision to be made in the context of the impossibility to duplicate a 
facility requirement is whether to take an absolute or relative perspective. 
113 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (t/as Auto Fashions Australia) [2001] 50 Intellectual 
Property Reports 257, 274 (HCA) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ para 70. 
114 Stephen Corones ,, Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act: Rules of Battle revisited " (2001) 29 ABLR 
252, 256. 
115 Me/way Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (tlas Auto Fashions Australia) [2001] 50 Intellectual 
Property Reports 257, 274 (HCA) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ para 17; Queensland Wire 
Industries Proprietary Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and another [ 1988-1989] 
167 CLR 177, 191 (HCA) Mason CJ and Wilson J. 
11 6 See art 3 (1) (g) of the EC Treaty, s 1 of the Act Against Restraint of Competition and s IA of the 
Commerce Act 1986. 
11 7 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 2001 Competition Law Update 5; Queensland Wire 
Industries Proprietary Limited v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited and another [1988-1989] 
167CLR 177, 191 (HCA)MasonCJandWilsonJ. 
11 8 Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to Essential Facilities in Australia " 28 Australian 
Business Law Review 325, 338. 
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The absolute perspective would take all the competitors or potential competitors 
into account. The entry has to be forced by an access right granted by competition 
authorities or courts if none of these competitors would be able to enter the market 
without such an intervention. The relative approach would use objective criteria but only 
in relation to the particular competitor that demands access to the market. 
As mentioned above, competition law focuses on competition as a whole and not 
the competitiveness of a single competitor. Therefore, in Australia the question is 
answered in favour of the absolute view. It has to be evaluated, "whether it would be 
economical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service [ emphasis 
added]".11 9 
The European legislation and court decisions are m line with this Australian 
approach. The ECJ held in the case of Bronner that 120 
it would be necessary at the very least to establish, as the Advocate General has pointed 
out at point 68 of his Opinion, that it is not economically viable to create a second home-
delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers distributed by the existing 
scheme. 
As a result, the perspective is absolute and not in relation between the owner of 
the facility and the would-be entrant. 
As section lA of the Commerce Act 1986 states the objective of the Act as 
promotion of competition for the benefit of consumers, New Zealand focuses on 
competition rather than on the competitor. The approach taken under section 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 should be absolute, too. 
11 9 Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to Essential Facilities in Australia " 28 ABLR 325, 
335. 
120 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. 
KG ([1998] ECR 1-7791) para 46. 
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The question is, whether this is also true for Germany. The situation there seems 
to be different. This illustrates the comparison with the Australian provisions. Sections 44 
G (2) (a) and (b) focus on the promotion of competition in a market and the impossibility 
for anyone to develop another facility to decide whether the service should be declared. 
In Germany the focus is on the single competitor as applicant. § 19 IV Nr. 4 GWB 
regards the denial of access for another undertaking as misuse of a dominant position. 
Therefore, the wording of the subsection indicates the focus on the particular applicant 
though from the point of view of competition it would be sufficient, if another 
undertaking would be capable of the duplication. This would also create potential 
competition. 
However, the justification of the German government of the new subsection 
emphasises that a facility is only essential if competitors are unable to establish an equal 
facility. 121 Though the government refers to more than one competitor, this is not 
enlightening. This can also have the meaning of just multiple applicants rather than an 
absolute perspective. Though the later interpretation would be in line with the other 
jurisdictions under scrutiny it is up to the German courts to use the tool of teleological 
reduction 122 to limit the scope of§ 19 GWB to an absolute perspective. The phrasing of 
the subsection could be regarded as generalisation and therefore used only in a restrictive 
manner. Until the courts decide on that issue one has to take the statutory provision as 
one finds it. That indicates a relative approach in Germany while other jurisdictions have 
chosen an absolute approach. 
E Denial of Access at all or under reasonable Conditions 
One other requirement that can be identified in all jurisdictions in question is that 
the undertaking in a dominant position or with a substantial degree of market power has 
to deny the would-be entrant access to the market. Only in some rare and special occasion 
121 Justification of§ 19 IV Nr.4 GWB by the German Government, BT-Drs. 13/9720, 73 . 
122 This is a tool of German statute interpretation that cuts back the extensive application of a statute to a 
level that was originally intended by the legislator. 
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access will be denied at all. 123 The owners of facilities to which other competitors want 
access generally such blatant behaviour. Therefore, the most common offence against 
competition law is not the refusal to deal at all but to deal only under conditions that are 
less favourable than the conditions the owner would charge subsidiaries or related 
companies. The conditions or the prices are just disadvantageous.124 
Under the first circumstances, the courts only have to decide whether an access 
right should be granted. This decision can be made fairly easy using the essential 
facilities doctrine or the general misuse rule. The hard task for competition authorities or 
the courts to solve is to deal with the terms of the access. If the parties cannot reach an 
agreement on the terms and prices of the access it is up to the authorities to come up with 
a solution. This task is almost impossible to accomplish. In the case of the first access to a 
facility the judge would have to draft a contract without any guidelines and in further 
violation of the freedom of contract. The landmark case of Telecom v Clear illustrates the 
problem. 125 This example demonstrates the difficulty competition authorities and courts 
can have with decisions concerning access rights. This is another advantage of an 
industry specific regulator that can fall back on thorough rules. 
As a consequence, the legislator, when deciding whether to establish an industry 
specific regulator or not, might also consider whether the national authorities experience 
many difficulties in applying either the essential facilities doctrine or the general rules of 
misuse of market power. 
123 This includes landmark cases like Bronner and Me/way . 
124 Such a behaviour can be identified in landmark decisions like Telecom v Clear, QWI, Port Nelson and 
Stena Sea/ink. 
125 Telecom did not deny Clear the access to the local loop and the national network completely. It just 
demanded terms like an access key and wanted to charge prices it would charge any other customer, too . 
Telecom even came up with an economist model to prove that the charging of monopoly prices would be 
tolerable because Clear could compete by charging lower prices to its customers. This model is now known 
as the Baumol-Willig-Rule after its inventors. Through this, it could reduce these opportunity costs over 
time. 
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F Enabling Competition 
It is a requirement that the granting of an access right enables competition in an 
up- or downstream market. 
As mentioned above, the right to access another ones facility is limited to 
exceptional circumstances. It is not enough that it is a mere convenience or a competitve 
advantage for the would-be entrant. 126 An access right is justifiable only where barriers to 
entry are almost insurmountable. 
[I]t must be extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking demanding access but for 
any other undertaking to compete. Thus, if the cost of duplicating the facility alone is the 
barrier to entry, it must be such as to deter any prudent undertaking from entering the 
market. 127 
In other words, the access must be crucial to compete with an overwhelming large 
incumbent and in spite of barriers to entry such as high capital costs and large economies 
of scale.128 
G Unfeasible to share the Facility 
The defence of the owner of a facility against the claim of a would-be entrant is 
that access is unfeasible. 
1 Infeasibility 
"Infeasibility" is a very ambiguous term. The owner of the facility will set the 
threshold of unfeasibility lower as this would prevent the other competitor from entering. 
The owner could secure the investments and could go on making the profits he or she 
calculated with in the beginning. The would-be entrant will try to set the threshold of 
126 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998 ([1998] ECR I-7791) para 65 . 
127 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998, above, para 66. 
128 Daniel Clough "Economic Duplication and Access to Essential Facilities in Australia " 28 ABLR 325, 
334. 
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infeasibility as high as possible. It 1s possible only then to enter the facility under 
relatively easy terms. 
The case of MCI regarded the access right under the essential facilities doctrine as 
unjustified if the access would be impractical for the owner. If this means it is just 
inconvienient for the owner, the threshold is too low. This would give the owner an 
advantage that would make the essential facilities doctrine useless. Therefore, unfeasible 
must be construed as having the meaning of almost impossible. The essential facilities 
doctrine only works with such a high threshold. If policy reasons make an access right 
desireable, a low threshold must not cross the whole construction. 
As a consequence, it is no argument that the two opponents dislike each other. 
Arguments that create infeasibility are safety reasons, where the competitor would 
threaten the lives of people involved. Another argument is that the owner of the facility 
would not survive economically if he or she had to allow someone to use the facility. 
2 Promotion of a Competitor 
A further question is whether an owner of a facility can argue that the applicant 
cannot be connected to the network due to technical differences between the two systems 
or lack of capacities. The owner could be obliged to promote that competitor through the 
necessary changes instead. Another question is whether the owner of the facility has to 
provide additional capacity if there is some free capacity but not enough to provide every 
applicant with the desired space. 
Usually, no one is obliged to promote a competitor to its own detriment. 
However, in the area of the essential facilities doctrine, for the benefit of competition and 
consumers, the owner cannot retreat to that position. If the interconnection is possible, the 
facility has to be altered. However, the costs have to be paid for by the new entrant.
129 
129 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385, 401 (PC), Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson. 
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If there is not enough capacity for all competitors, the owner has to to make sure 
that the access is granted on non-discriminatory terms. 130 
3 Burden of Proof 
Although the claimant has to prove all the criteria of the essential facilities 
doctrine, he or she does not have to prove that the access is feasible. The burden of proof 
is with the owner of the facility. This is only just 
because the possible reasons for a justification of the denial of an access right are almost all 
in the sphere of influence of the owner of the essential facility . The claimant has hardly 
any chance to assess these.131 
As a consequence, where there is doubt about infeasibility of an access right, the 
access right has to be granted. 
H Change of German approach? 
As illustrated before, the German legislator established § 19 IV Nr.4 GWB as a 
special case of the misuse of market power that is covered by § 19 I GWB. One could 
argue that the phrasing of the subsection changed the behavioural approach to a structural 
one. 
The origin of the essential facilities doctrine is the misuse of some market power. 
This means that the monopoly position itself was not deemed to be punishable. This is 
different in the US where the Sherman Act of 1890 tries to prevent the maintenance of 
monopolies although a competitor in a dominant position in a market is allowed to charge 
whatever price he or she sees fit. In the European systems the charging of monopoly 
prices is very likely to be regarded as misuse of a dominant position. This illustrates that 
the dominant competitor has to do something blameworthy to trigger actions of the 
130 Hilmer Report, eh 11 , 256. 
131 Justification of§ 19 IV Nr.4 GWB by the German Government, BT-Drs. 13/9720, 73 . 
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competition authorities.
132 It could be argued that the German legislator changed this 
approach with the new regulation in § 19 IV Nr. 4 GWB. Under this subsection, the 
trigger for action could be seen as the market power of the owner of the facility alone 
without any reference to certain behaviour. 133 
On the European level the European Commission and the ECJ are in charge of 
competition law. Both authorities made their point that the doctrine if applied at all within 
article 82 of the EC Treaty should be used thoughtfully and with care. The implications 
could be significant if the doctrine is used in an extensive manner. The market power of 
the dominant competitor alone is not enough to rectify any action. 
The ownership of a network or infrastructure and the burden of proof on the side 
of the owner to establish the infeasibility of access are considered together. This 
diminishes the effect the behaviour of the dominant competitor has on a decision. The 
concern relating to that approach is that the general competition authorities could be 
placed in a position where they are expected to act as fulltime administrators for the 
access to certain facilities and become like industry specific regulators. 134 In that scenario 
the authorities would not be equipped for such a task. However, even after the change of 
legislation the different agencies still have to assess the refusal to deal or the denial of 
access in the light of the misuse of a dominant competitor's position. Therefore, the 
behaviour of a dominant competitor is still the primary focus while its position is just 
another criteria. The circumstance that the burden of proof is with the owner of the 
facility is also no argument for a change to a structural approach. The objective of the 
new legislation would be thwarted if the applicant had to prove that the access is feasible. 
Only the defendant has the necessary knowledge about his or her facility to prove that the 
132 The focus of this approach is on the behaviour of the competitor. Therefore, this can be called 
behavioural approach. 
133 As the focus of this approach is on the market power of a certain competitor, which relates to the market 
structure, this can be named structural approach. 
134 Meinrad Dreher, "Die Verweigerung des Zugangs zu einer wesentlichen Einrichtung als Missbrauch der 
Marktbeherrschung" (1999) 16 DB 833, 835. 
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access is unfeasible.
135 The statement by the would-be entrant that it is feasible to let him 
or her access the facility can only be vague and could be rejected easily. 
As a result, there is no room for concerns that the cartel authority is not dealing 
with misuse of a dominant position or behaviour anymore. 
VII TELECOMMUNICATION 
This part of the paper gives a short overview about the historical background of 
privatisations taking place in the telecommunications sector of Germany, Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
With the globalisation and the corresponding need for access to information at 
literally every place in the world, access to telecommunications networks is one of the 
major concerns of businesses worldwide. These networks illustrate very well the 
influence of former-state ownership, the importance of access rights, the related problems 
of defining reasonable terms of access and the advantages as well as disadvantages of 
industry specific regulators. 
A Europe 
On the European level several directives 136 prepared the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector in the Member States. Further, the 1998 Access Notice 
137
, as a 
135 The burden of proof on the side of the owner of the facility in question is only just because the possible 
reasons for a justification of the denial of an access right are almost all in the sphere of influence of the 
owner of the essential facility. The claimant has hardly any chance to assess these . Justification of§ 19 IV 
Nr.4 GWB by the German Government, BT-Drs. 13/9720, 73. 
136 One set of these directives are the liberalisation directives issued under article 90 of the EC Treaty (now 
article 86 of the EC Treaty) . These are the Commission Directive 88/301 /EEC of 16 May 1988 on 
competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment; the Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services; the 
Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 amending the Directive 88/301 /EEC and the Directive 
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications; Commission Directive 95/16/EC of 18 
October 1995 amending the Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use 
of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalised telecommunications services; 
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comprehensive document, now defines behaviour that contradicts the required behaviour 
under articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. This access regime applies to cases with 
European implications. Nevertheless, the national regulatory authorities have parallel 
authority. 
B Germany 
Therefore, Germany is responsible for competition and access to national 
telecommunications networks. 
Liberalisation of Germany's telecommunications sector took place from the early 
1990s onward and was finally finshed in 1996. 138 Telecommunications as well as postal 
Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending the Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to 
mobile and personal communications; and Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending 
the Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full competition in the telecommunications 
markets (the "Full Competition Directive"). 
The other set of these directives are the harmonisation directives issued under article 100 a of the EC Treaty 
(now article 95 of the EC Treaty). These are the Directive 97/ 13/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework of authorisations and individual licences in the field of 
of telecommunications services (the "Licensing Directive"); the Directive 97/33/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to 
ensuing universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of network provision 
(the "Interconnection Directive"); the Council Directive 90/387/EEC of28 June 1990 on the establishment 
of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network 
provision (the "Framework Directive"); the Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application 
of open network provision to leased lines (the "Leased Lines Directive"); the Directive 95/62/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application of open network provision to 
voice telephony, which was replaced by the Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 26 February 1998 on the application of open network provision to voice telephony and on 
universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment (the "Voice Telepony Directive"); 
and the Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector (the "Data 
Protection Directive"). 
137 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector 
- 98/C 265/02. 
138 Olivier Boylaud and Giuseppe Nicoletti "Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in 
Telecommunications " Economics Department Working Papers o. 237, OECD, 2000, 30; Claus Zanker 
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services were formerly state-owned and administered by the same ministry139. The 
privatisation of these services created the Deutsche Telekom AG for telecommunications 
services and the Deutsche Post AG for postal services. 
Along with these privatisation measures, the German legislator ruled in favour of 
the creation of an industry specific regulator. The TKG came into force on 1 August 1996 
and established the Regulierungsbehorde fiir Telekommunikation und Post. This 
regulatory authority for telecommunications and postal services took up its work on 1 
January 1998. Further, the special statutes of the TKG and the PostG were implemented 
to regulate these areas and give the regulator the necessary guidelines for its work. 
The last step concermng the liberalisation of telecommunications was the 
deregulation of the voice telephony sector in 1998. 140 
The TKG also gives the Regulierungsbehorde fiir Telekommunikation und Post 
the power to decide about the fees for access to a network. The latest development is the 
reduction of access fees in the area of local loops 141 to reduce prices in this area. This 
happened after comprehensive market analysis. 142 This analysis was possible because the 
industry specific regulator has the manpower and knowledge to research the best possible 
price for competition. A court would not have been able to deliver the same thorough 
result. 
,, Privatisation and Liberalisation of the Post and Telecommunication Sector - its Impact on Employees and 
Trade Unions" http: //www.input-consulting.com/download/berlin-pt-eng.pdf (Last accessed 2 August 
2002) page 5. 
139 Postministerium - Ministry of Postal Services. 
140 Volker Emmerich Kartellrecht (9th Edition, C.H. Beck, Milnchen, 2001) 333; Thomas Nollgen 
"Kartellrechtliche Probleme bei der Nutzung fremder Netze und lnfrastruktureinrichtungen " 
http://www.uni-muenster.de/J ura.deu/Referate-WS-2002/Therna-02-Noellgen.PDF (Last accessed 2 August 
2002). 
141 Also called "last mile". REGTP ,, Regulierer senkt Einmalentgelte zur "letzten Meile"" 
http://www.regtp.de/aktuelles/prn/02530/index.htrnl (Last accessed 27 May 2002). 
142 REGTP ,, Regulierer senkt Einmalentgelte zur "letzten Meile"" 
http: //www.regtp.de/aktuelles/prn/02530/index.html (Last accessed 27 May 2002). 
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C Australia 
In the area of telecommunications Australia established two industry specific 
regulators and comprehensive regulation in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to 
deal with the access to telecommunications networks. 
Australia's telecommunications sector was privatised in in the years 1996/97. 143 Australia 
set up the Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL) to monitor this area as 
an industry specific regulator. On 1 July 1997, the Australian telecommunications 
industry became subject to a new regulatory framework. In the wake of this, the 
Australian Communications Authority (ACA) and the ACCC were established as 
industry specific regulators in this area. The ACA was formed as a result of the merging 
of the Spectrum Management Agency (SMA) and AUSTEL. 144 The ACA regulates 
telecommunications consumer and technical matters. The ACCC regulates competition in 
the telecommunications industry after taking over these responsibilities from AUSTEL 
on 1 July 1997. 145 
D New Zealand 
In New Zealand until 1987 the public telecommunication system was a state 
monopoly conducted by the Post Office. In 1987 Telecom Corporation New Zealand Ltd, 
then a state-owned enterprise acquired the system. It continued to enjoy a virtual 
monopoly. On 1 April 1989 all telecommunication markets in New Zealand were 
deregulated and opened to competition. 146 In September 1990 the government sold all its 
shares in Telecom, save one (the Kiwi Share) to privately owned interests. 
143 Olivier Boylaud and Giuseppe Nicoletti "Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in 
Telecommunications" Economics Department Working Papers No. 237, OECD, 2000, 30; Claus Zanker 
,, Privatisation and Liberalisation of the Post and Telecommunication Sector - its Impact on Employees and 
Trade Unions " http://www.input-consulting.com/download/berlin-pt-eng.pdf (Last accessed 2 August 
2002) page 5. 
144 Overview The Australian Telecommunications Regulatory 
http: //www.aca.gov.au/authority/overview.htm (Last accessed 20 May 2002). 
145 Overview_ The Australian Telecommunications Regulatory Environment, above. 
146 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 2001 Competition Law Update 3. 
Environment, 
56 
Unlike in Germany and Australia, New Zealand chose "light-handed regulation". 
The Government issued a policy statement in December 1991: 147 
The Government sees competition as the best regulator of telecommunications markets. 
Accordingly, there will continue to be no statutory or regulatory barriers to competitive 
entry into telecommunications markets in New Zealand.[ ... ] To maintain the conditions of 
effective competition, the Government places primary reliance upon the operations of the 
Commerce Act 1986. In particular, it relies on the enforcement of the statutory prohibitions 
against anti-competitive practices. 
Especially in the telecommunications sector, with several cases involving 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd this attitude changed over the years. 
The light-handed regulatory approach introduced in New Zealand in the late 1980s was 
predicated on the existence of effective competition within markets and, where robust 
competition does not occur, on the threat of price control and information disclosure to 
deter firms with market power from abusing their position of dominance. Government 
members considered that this approach has not prevented some dominant firms from over-
pricing their goods and services and generally behaving in an anti-competitive manner to 
the detriment of consumers. In particular, reliance on potential competition 
("contestability") as a substitute for actual competition is considered to have been an 
overly optimistic assumption. 
Finally, the Telecommunications Act 2001 established the Telecommunications 
Commissioner. Apart from other tasks, the Commissioner has to resolve disputes over 
access to regulated services for the long-term benefit of New Zealand.
148 
E Telecom v Clear 
A case that illustrates the disadvantages of light-handed regulation in general and 
the insufficiency in the area of telecommunications in particular is Telecom v Clear 1
49
. 
147 New Zealand Law Society Seminar August 2001 Competition Law Update 3. 
14s Landmark Telecommunications Act Passed 
http: //www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/minister200 l l 2 l 8a.htrnl (Last accessed 13 June 2002). 
149 Telecom v Clear Communications [ 1992] 3 NZLR 24 7 (HC); Clear Communications v Telecom ( 1993) 
5 TCLR 413 (CA); Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385 
57 
First, the different courts that had to decide this case encountered considerable 
difficulties in gathering and understanding the relevant facts as these facts were all very 
technical in their nature. 
Secondly one of the major disadvantages of a court decision rather than a decision 
of an industry specific regulator according to certain guidelines is summarised by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in the following way: 150 
It is a regrettable fact that the decision of this appeal will only decide whether, in the past, 
Telecom has abused its dominant market position. It will not decide whether Clear' s past 
stance in negotiations was reasonable, let alone fix the terms for interconnection. 
The limited scope of court decisions is also a disadvantage in terms of certainty. Unlike 
in the situation with an industry specific regulator no statutory guidelines exist. These 
guidelines not only make decisions for the regulator easier but also for the companies that 
have to act according to the provisions of the Commerce Act. Uncertainty and lack of 
predictability create high compliance costs and the threat of penalties. The discussion in 
Telecom v Clear about the right test for a breach of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
illustrates the confusion a general rule can create to the detriment of all parties involved. 
Different minds can easily reach different views on what is reasonable or justifiable. Yet if 
a Court subsequently were to disagree with a monopolist's genuine assessment that he was 
acting reasonably or with justification, the consequence would be that not only would he 
be liable for substantial damages but he might also have exposed himself (in the case of a 
corporate monopolist) to a quasi-criminal penalty of up to $5m under s 80 of the 
Commerce Act. In Their Lordships ' view, s 36 must be construed in such a way as to 
enable the monopolist, before he enters upon a line of conduct, to know with some 
· h h . . 1 ful 15 1 certainty w et er or not 1t 1s aw . 
(PC); The Telecom Corporation is a formerly state-owned provider of telecommunication services. Clear 
Communications wanted to enter the market of local phone calls. To be effective it needed access to the 
network and the loops of Telecom. Telecom only offered rates and fees that Clear thought where 
unreasonable and abusive. 
150 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd, above, 390 (PC), Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. 
151 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd, above, 403 (PC), Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
The essential facilities doctrine has its roots in US antitrust law. To transfer it to 
other jurisdictions one has to make some adjustments. The requirements have to be 
modified to the special needs of the different countries. The US rolemodel and cases can 
function as guidelines while the historical and legal background of the United States have 
to be taken into account. 
Depending on the size and the importance of a certain facility the readiness of the 
different jurisdictions to apply the essential facilities doctrine varies. New Zealand is the 
most sceptical jurisdiction. Apart from the Telecommunications Commissioner acting 
under the Telecommunications Act 2001 New Zealand relies solely on the general rule of 
section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 to cover the refusal to deal and other misuses of a 
substantial degree of market power. Australia and Germany have very thorough 
regulation of access to facilities and networks of national importance like the 
telecommunications industry with even industry specific regulators. These jurisdictions 
showed their readiness to recognise the doctrine through the implementation of Parts XIC 
and IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 for Australia and § 19 IV Nr.4 GWB in 
Germany. Europe recognises the essential facilities doctrine to a certain extend although 
only within the general rules of articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. However, the EC 
Commission and the ECJ are both very well aware of the consequences of the application 
of the doctrine. At least after the landmark decision of Bronner this principle is used in a 
very considerate, thoughtful and restrictive manner. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the essential facilities doctrine is just a label or 
a tool for the competition authorities to use with great care. One could live very well 
without it. The doctrine is basically a set of requirements for the authorities to check 
under the general rules of the misuse of a dominant position. The advantage of an 
instrument like this, be it statutory implemented or not, is the creation of clarity and 
certainty. In spite of the problems of identifying common features of the doctrine in 
different jurisdictions, the established criteria help the owners of certain facilities to know 
in advance if there is a possibility of another competitor entering the facility. The courts 
also have some guidelines and are not left alone completely with the general rule only. 
59 
Within these limitations the essential facilities doctrine is justifiable and helpful. 
The establishment of industry specific regulators should be enhanced in areas of 
high complexity and national or even international importance. 
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